Logic and majority voting
Logic and majority voting
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逻辑和多数表决
DOI:
10.1007/s10992-021-09631-7
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Ryo Takemura
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jeremiah Alberg;Eve Grace;Christopher Kelly;Ryo Takemura
To investigate the relationship between logical reasoning and majority voting, we introduce logic with groups Lg in the style of Gentzen’s sequent calculus, where every sequent is indexed by a group of individuals. We also introduce the set-theoretical semantics of Lg, where every formula is interpreted as a certain closed set of groups whose members accept that formula. We present the cut-elimination theorem, and the soundness and semantic completeness theorems of Lg. Then, introducing an inference rule representing majority voting to Lg, we introduce logic with majority voting Lv. Formalizing the discursive paradox in judgment aggregation theory, we show that Lv is inconsistent. Based on the premise-based and conclusion-based approaches to avoid the paradox, we introduce logic with majority voting for axioms Lva, where majority voting is applied only to non-logical axioms as premises to construct a proof in Lg, and logic with majority voting for conclusions Lvc, where majority voting is applied only to the conclusion of a proof in Lg. We show that both Lvaand Lvcare syntactically complete and consistent, and we construct collective judgments based on the provability in Lvaand Lvc, respectively. Then, we discuss how these systems avoid the discursive paradox.