Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
复制标题
探索战争的讨价还价模式
DOI：
10.1017/s1537592703000033
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Dan Reiter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dan Reiter
战争的谈判模式将战争的发动、起诉、终止和后果视为单一谈判过程的一部分。这篇文章集中在这个主题的最新作品，其中许多采用正式的技术，它适用于战争的不同阶段的模型。它还讨论了讨价还价模型的实证工作的状态。最后，本文考虑了讨价还价模型如何与其他战争和国际关系理论相结合，包括认知心理学，组织理论，国内政治和建构主义。他感谢里萨布鲁克斯，海因戈曼斯，特德霍普夫，罗伯特鲍威尔，布鲁斯罗塞特，阿拉斯泰尔史密斯，艾伦斯塔姆和苏珊娜沃纳的评论。他想指出，任何剩余的错误都是他自己的。
The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.For comments, he thanks Risa Brooks, Hein Goemans, Ted Hopf, Robert Powell, Bruce Russett, Alastair Smith, Allan Stam, and Suzanne Werner. He would like to note that any remaining errors are exclusively his own.