Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
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罕见但严厉的一致惩罚有利于合作
DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005
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发表时间：
2012-06-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Chu, Tianguang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deng, Kuiying;Li, Zhuozheng;Chu, Tianguang
代价惩罚作为解释不相关个体间合作演化的机制之一，存在个体福利降低、二次搭便车、难以捕捉、可能引发报复等弊端，即利他个体私下承担惩罚背叛的成本。为了完善这一有希望的机制，我们提出了一种扩展的公共产品博弈，其中有罕见但严厉的协同惩罚，一旦叛逃者被抓住，惩罚就会被触发，惩罚的成本由其他群体平均分担。分析结果表明，当协同惩罚的概率大于一定阈值时，在有限种群中，合作是一种进化稳定的策略，而背叛则不是，这种惩罚方式可以显著降低抑制背叛的总成本，特别是在大种群中。(C) 2012爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
As one of the mechanisms that are supposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals, costly punishment, in which altruistic individuals privately bear the cost to punish defection, suffers from such drawbacks as decreasing individuals' welfare, inducing second-order free riding, the difficulty of catching defection, and the possibility of triggering retaliation. To improve this promising mechanism, here we propose an extended Public Goods game with rare but severe concerted punishment, in which once a defector is caught punishment is triggered and the cost of punishment is equally shared among the remainder of the group. Analytical results show that, when the probability for concerted punishment is above a threshold, cooperating is, while defecting is not, an evolutionarily stable strategy in finite populations, and that this way of punishment can considerably decrease the total cost of inhibiting defection, especially in large populations. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.