Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
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冲突是谈判过程的一部分
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Sánchez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Sánchez
本文探讨了冲突作为讨价还价工具的作用。它首先提出了一种带有片面不完全信息的简单讨价还价模型。各方可以选择他们想要参与的对抗范围：仅导致延迟的有限冲突，或终止游戏的绝对冲突。两种对抗的结果都是由双方的相对实力决定的，而只有其中一方知道这一点。因此，非最终冲突传达了有关绝对冲突的最终结果的信息。在这个框架中，表明对抗具有双刃效应：当不知情的一方过于乐观以至于无法达成协议时，它可能会矛盾地打开达成协议的大门。但当可能达成协议但知情的代理人有动机通过战斗来提高其讨价还价地位时，它也会造成效率低下。本文的第二部分对 1817 年至 1988 年间发生的殖民和帝国战争样本进行了持续时间分析。结果提供了说明在谈判中使用冲突的证据。
This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that only introduces delay, or an absolute conflict that terminates the game. The outcomes of both types of confrontation are driven by the relative strength of the parties that is only known to one of them. Therefore, the non-final conflict conveys information about the eventual outcome of the absolute one. In this framework, it is shown that confrontation has a double-edged effect: It may paradoxically open the door to agreement when the uninformed party is so optimistic that no agreement is feasible. But it can also create inefficiency when agreement is possible but the informed agent has an incentive to improve her bargaining position by fighting. The second part of the paper performs a duration analysis on a sample of colonial and imperial wars fought between 1817 and 1988. The results offer evidence illustrating the use of conflict in negotiations.