The Political Economy of Contract Farming
The Political Economy of Contract Farming
复制标题
订单农业的政治经济学
DOI：
10.1177/048661348601800403
复制
发表时间：
1986
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
John Wilson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John Wilson
农业企业提倡订单农业作为一种更有效的农作物和牲畜生产方法。然而，有证据表明，合同减少了农民对其经营的控制，同时增加了他们面临的风险。解释承包传播的传统模型强调技术因素（例如，规模经济、作物易腐烂性、不同生产阶段之间的技术互补性是误导性的和不充分的）。另一种模式强调“分包”生产组织对大型农业综合企业的效用。对合同扩散的仔细研究表明，大多数农业企业已经退出整合，转而采用外包，并且只要满足以下条件，承包扩散就会扩大：(1) 加工商相对于生产者来说很少，(2) 生产者专业化，(3) 拍卖和当地终端数量减少，(4) 农场经营过剩且信贷紧缩，(5) 农民组织不善，(6) 政府支持薄弱。只要农业企业继续集中、政府支持恶化、农场变得更加专业化，承包的趋势就会持续下去。
Contract farming is promoted by agribusiness as a more efficient method of crop and livestock production. Evidence suggests, however, that contracts diminish control by farmers over their operation while increasing their exposure to risk. Conventional models accounting for the spread of contracting emphasize technological factors (e.g., economies of scale, crop perishability, technological complementarity between different stages of production are misleading and inadequate). An alternative model emphasizes the utility of the "subcontracting" organization of production for large agribusiness corporations. A close examination of the spread of contracts reveals that most agribusinesses have pulled back from integration in favor of contracting out and that contracting spreads wherever (1) processors are few in relation to producers, (2) producers are specialized, (3) auction and local terminals have declined in number, (4) there is a surplus of farm operations and credit is tight, (5) farmer's are poorly organized and (6) government supports are weak. The trend toward contracting will continue so long as agribusiness concentration continues, government supports deteriorate, and farms become more specialized.