Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm
Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm
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具有社会责任感的企业存在的内生市场结构
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-017-0262-3
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jin-Li Hu;Satoshi Honma;and Hsiao-Ping Hsieh;本間聡;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Kiyoshi Matsubara;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本文研究了具有可替代产品的非对称双头垄断企业的内生战略契约选择问题。双头垄断企业由具有销售授权的典型管理型企业和具有社会责任的企业（CSR企业）组成，CSR企业的管理授权契约是社会福利和产量的线性组合。特别是，我们研究如何均衡的市场结构的变化，从情况下，有两个公司采用销售委托合同的情况下，其中一个公司成为一个企业社会责任的公司，后企业的所有者选择他们的战略合同。我们证明了在纯战略契约类下，两个战略契约不对称的市场结构可以成为均衡市场结构。此外，我们考虑了一个独特的混合策略均衡，以研究两个非对称均衡市场结构之间的风险支配如何影响均衡选择。研究发现，当具有销售代表权的企业和具有社会责任的企业分别具有价格契约和数量契约时，企业间的竞争比具有数量契约和价格契约时的竞争更具有风险优势。最后，通过推导出四个子博弈中社会福利的顺序，我们表明，社会激励与私人激励不一致的鲁棒均衡中的风险控制在内生选择博弈的战略合同的不对称双寡头企业与销售代表团和企业社会责任的企业。
We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. the duopoly comprises a typical managerial firm with a sales delegation and a socially responsible firm (CSR firm) with a linear combination of social welfare and quantity as its managerial delegation contract. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium market structure changes from the case wthere both firms adopt sales delegation contracts to the case wthere one of the firms becomes a CSR firm, after the owners of the firms select their strategic contracts. We show that two market structures that are asymmetric with respect to their strategic contracts can become equilibrium market structures under the pure strategic contract class. Furthermore, we consider a unique mixed strategy equilibrium to examine how the risk domination between the two asymmetric equilibrium market structures affects equilibrium selection. there, we find that the competition wthere the firm with the sales delegation and the CSR firm have a price contract and a quantity contract, respectively, risk-dominates the competition wthere the firms have a quantity contract and a price contract, respectively. Finally, by deriving the order of social welfare among the four subgames, we show that the social incentive does not coincide with the private incentive in the robust equilibrium with respect to risk domination in the endogenous selection game of the strategic contracts of the asymmetric duopoly with the firm with a sales delegation and the CSR firm.