INDIRECT CONTROL AND POWER
INDIRECT CONTROL AND POWER
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DOI：
10.5277/ord160202
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发表时间：
2016-01-01
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Stach, Izabella
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bertini, Cesarino;Mercik, Jacek;Stach, Izabella
确定谁在股份公司中拥有权力可能是一个相当复杂的问题，特别是当控制权是通过股东之间的联盟实现的时候。在间接控制公司的情况下，即在涉及股东和交叉持股公司的情况下，这个问题尤其突出。第一个解决间接股权控制情况下权力衡量问题的是Gianfranco Gambarelli和Guillermo Owen [10]。在接下来的几年里，推出了许多其他型号。在本文中，我们严格审查的模型：甘巴雷利和欧文，丹蒂和普拉蒂，克拉马和勒鲁斯，卡罗斯和彼得斯，以及Mercik和Lobos，考虑到两个著名的，说明性的例子，一个与非循环的公司结构和其他的循环结构。
To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex problem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.