Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups
Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups
复制标题
DOI：
10.1038/s41562-018-0338-z
复制
发表时间：
2018-05-01
影响因子：
29.9
通讯作者：
Rusch, Hannes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dogan, Goenuel;Glowacki, Luke;Rusch, Hannes
群体间的暴力冲突造成广泛的危害；然而，在整个人类历史上，破坏性敌对行动一次又一次地发生(1，2)。胜利方可以获得的好处包括领土扩张、威慑和集团间资源竞争的优势(3-6)。其中许多是集团所有成员都可以获得的非排他性商品，而参与则会带来相当大的个人风险和成本。因此，集体行动问题出现了，提出了为什么个人要参加这样的运动的问题(7-9)。区分进攻性和防御性集团间攻击提供了部分答案：防御性攻击在许多情况下是适应的(10-14)。然而，参与攻击性侵略，如突袭或征服战争，仍然需要一个解释。在这里，我们集中讨论一个假设条件，即促进进攻性群体间侵略的出现：不对称地分配冲突战利品可能会促使那些从这种不平等中获利的人发起群体间攻击，即使这样做会危及他们群体的福利(15-17)。我们通过操纵三个关系和平或暴力的埃塞俄比亚社会在竞赛实验中如何分享胜利者的利益来检验这一假设。在平等分享的情况下，群体间的敌意增加了竞赛贡献。相比之下，不平等分享促使特权参与者采取进攻性贡献策略，而弱势参与者则采取防御性策略，两者都与群体关系无关。
Violent intergroup conflicts cause widespread harm; yet, throughout human history, destructive hostilities occur time and time again(1,2). Benefits that are obtainable by victorious parties include territorial expansion, deterrence and ascendency in between-group resource competition(3-6). Many of these are non-excludable goods that are available to all group members, whereas participation entails substantial individual risks and costs. Thus, a collective action problem emerges, raising the question why individuals participate in such campaigns at all(7-9). Distinguishing offensive and defensive intergroup aggression provides a partial answer: defensive aggression is adaptive under many circumstances(10-14). However, participation in offensive aggression, such as raids or wars of conquest, still requires an explanation. Here, we focus on one condition that is hypothesized to facilitate the emergence of offensive intergroup aggression: asymmetric division of a conflict's spoils may motivate those profiting from such inequality to initiate between-group aggression, even if doing so jeopardizes their group's welfare(15-17). We test this hypothesis by manipulating how benefits among victors are shared in a contest experiment among three Ethiopian societies whose relations are either peaceful or violent. Under equal sharing, between-group hostility increased contest contributions. By contrast, unequal sharing prompted offensive contribution strategies in privileged participants, whereas disadvantaged participants resorted to defensive strategies, both irrespective of group relations.