Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face
Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face
复制标题
非对称双头垄断中战略变量相对于企业面临的需求函数的内生选择
DOI：
10.1111/manc.12073
复制
发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
久留島潤;富田治芳;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本文研究了在所有权与经营权分离的双寡头市场中，企业面临的需求函数不对称的情况下，企业战略变量--价格或数量契约的内生选择问题。结果表明，当两个厂商面临的需求函数不对称程度较小时，均衡状态下可以观察到价格竞争和数量竞争，而当需求函数不对称程度较高时，均衡状态下可以观察到两种不同的市场结构，即两个所有者选择的策略变量不同。
This paper examines endogenous choice of firm's strategic variables—i.e. price or quantity contract—in a duopoly in which the demand functions that they face are asymmetric in managerial delegation case with separation between ownership and management. We show that when the degree of asymmetry between the demand functions that the two firms face is low, price and quantity competitions are observed in the equilibrium, whereas when the degree of such asymmetry is high, the two types of market structures in which the strategic variables selected by the two owners are different from each other are observed in the equilibrium.