Downstream new product development and upstream process innovation
Downstream new product development and upstream process innovation
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-023-00841-y
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发表时间：
2023-09
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Akio Kawasaki;Tomomichi Mizuno;Kazuhiro Takauchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Akio Kawasaki;Tomomichi Mizuno;Kazuhiro Takauchi
上游和下游市场的研究与开发（R&D）相互影响。这是因为，在装配行业中，当上游投入价格较低时，下游企业可以很容易地推出或开发新产品。新产品的推出创造了一个新的最终产品市场，增加了对投入的需求。对投入的需求增加，促使上游企业通过研发降低成本。在本研究中，我们考虑了下游的R&D新产品的推出和上游的R&D降低成本。我们发现，如果上游的R&D是有效的（无效的），下游的新产品引进竞赛的结果是战略互补（替代品）。此外，在时机上，上游企业在观察下游企业的投资决定后决定投入价格，上游企业通过提高投入价格从下游企业的研发中获取利益。众所周知，上游企业的这种行为阻碍了下游投资（套牢问题）。尽管有这种时间结构，我们表明，下游企业投资越多，投入价格越低。
Research and development (R&D) in upstream and downstream markets influence each other. This is because, in assembly industries, when upstream input prices are low, downstream firms can easily introduce or develop new products. The introduction of a new product creates a new final good market, creating an increased demand for inputs. This greater demand for inputs provides an incentive for upstream firms to reduce their costs through R&D. In this study, we consider both downstream R&D for new product introduction and upstream R&D for cost reduction. We show that if upstream R&D is efficient (inefficient), the results of the downstream new product introduction race are strategic complements (substitutes). Furthermore, in terms of timing, the upstream firm determines its input price after observing the downstream firm’s investment decision, with the upstream firm extracting benefits from downstream R&D by raising the input price. It is well-known that this behavior by upstream firms impedes downstream investment (the hold-up problem). Despite this timing structure, we show that the more downstream firms invest, the lower the input price.