The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice
The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice
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聆听儿童声音的认知挑战
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
K. Murris
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作者：
K. Murris
教育哲学中的经典概念区分假定了一种个人主义的主体性，隐藏了可以在儿童(作为教育者)和成人(作为学习者)之间进行的学习。根据两个来自经验的例子，我提出了这样的论点，即成年人在与孩子的教育接触中经常把隐喻的棍子塞进耳朵里。听者的偏见导致他们错过了孩子提供的知识，但成年人听不到。这与成年人如何看待教育、知识以及对儿童的看法有关，当儿童也是黑人时，这一点更加极端。这就是米兰达·弗里克所说的“认知性不公正”，即当某人以知情者的身份受到特别委屈时发生的。尽管她的作品涉及性别和种族，但我将她的激进思想推论给(黑人)孩子。认识到对儿童造成的认识论不公正，以及我提出的增加认识论谦逊和认识论平等的建议，可以帮助转变教学空间，将儿童主体纳入教育工作者。一个前进的方向被提出，包括“破解”儿童的概念和一个不同的非个人化的教育概念。
Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child (as educator) and adult (as learner). Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers’ prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’ which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to (black) child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves ‘cracking’ the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education.