China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk
China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk
复制标题
中国封闭式金字塔型管理劳动力市场与股价崩盘风险
DOI：
10.2308/accr-51867
复制
发表时间：
2018-05-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Liang, Shangkun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Donghua;Kim, Jeong-Bon;Liang, Shangkun
摘要：中国国有企业的管理者在一个封闭的金字塔型管理劳动力市场中工作。如果他们选择留在这一制度内，他们享有不可转让的福利。他们在劳动力市场上的地位越高（他们的政治地位），他们在外面的就业机会就越少。出于职业和财富方面的考虑，他们在管理公司时持谨慎态度和规避风险的态度。我们检验了经理人的政治地位对公司股价崩盘风险的影响，发现两者之间存在负相关。这种关联主要存在于管理人员较年轻和管理人员任期较短的公司。此外，只有在市场力量薄弱的地区、没有外国投资者、没有政治关系的企业以及在地方政府领导人或管理人员没有政治晋升的时期，这种影响才显著。我们的结论是，政治排名制度降低了股票价格崩溃的风险。JEL分类：G30; J33。
ABSTRACT: Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk. JEL Classifications: G30; J33.