A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
复制标题
获得转让市场极端核心分配的简单程序
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-007-0091-4
复制
发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
J. P. Villar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Hamers;F. Klijn;T. Solymosi;S. Tijs;J. P. Villar
给定一个分配市场，我们引入一组向量，每个向量对应于参与人集合上的每个可能的排序，我们将其命名为最大收益向量。这些向量中的每一个仅利用分配矩阵递归地获得。那些有效的最大收益向量给出了市场的极端核心配置。当分配博弈有一个大的核心时，所有的最大支付向量都是极端的核心分配。
Given an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the max-payoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn out to give the extreme core allocations of the market. When the assignment game has a large core, all the max-payoff vectors are extreme core allocations.