Collective action vs. conservation auction: Lessons from a social experiment of a collective auction of water conservation contracts in Japan
Collective action vs. conservation auction: Lessons from a social experiment of a collective auction of water conservation contracts in Japan
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DOI：
10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.06.010
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发表时间：
2015-07
期刊：
影响因子：
7.1
通讯作者：
M. Takeda;D. Takahashi;M. Shobayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Takeda;D. Takahashi;M. Shobayashi
在本研究中，我们通过社会实验探讨了保护合同“集体拍卖”的可能性以及相关问题。然后，我们提出了替代政策，以实现灌溉管理的集体行动和具有成本效益的水环境保护。在“集体拍卖”中，允许个体农民和农民团体参与。农民和农民团体之间可以进行沟通和协调。根据我们的参与调查以及与以往类似保护活动的环境费用的比较，拍卖结果表明，合同价格至少是具有成本效益的。此外，集体灌溉管理并未因拍卖而受到负面影响。我们发现，在积极参与当地资源管理集体行动的当地社区中，存在团体参与和价格协调的证据，从而节省了拍卖交易成本。相反，我们发现竞价也发生在个体农民层面。这种方法的差异取决于拍卖协调员对拍卖的承诺程度，这反映在他们对不成功投标的风险评估上。无论哪种情况，拍卖协调员都可以设法尽量减少拍卖中可能出现的不公平现象。尽管建立竞争环境以防止此类拍卖中可能出现的串通行为具有挑战性，但本研究提供的经验证据表明，现有本地资源管理中的集体行动可以降低拍卖交易成本。利用当地社区组织集体行动的能力可以降低这些成本，并最大限度地减少拍卖可能产生的不公平现象，从而促进拍卖带来的成本效益保护与集体行动保护当地资源之间的兼容性。最后，我们建议（1）通过为集体决策分配足够的时间来降低拍卖的交易成本；（2）保护计划的设计应尽量减少对生产基地的影响。
In this study, we explore the possibility of “collective auction” of conservation contracts, and related issues, through a social experiment. We then propose an alternative policy to achieve both collective action in irrigation management and cost-effective water environment conservation.In a “collective auction”, individual farmers as well as farmers’ groups are allowed to participate. Communication and coordination among farmers and farmers’ groups are allowed.Based on our participant survey and comparison with environmental payments for similar, previous conservation activities, the auction result shows that contract prices could be, at the very least, cost-effective. Moreover, collective irrigation management is not negatively affected owing to the auction.We find evidence of group participation and price coordination, which result in saving auction transaction costs, among local communities active in collective action in local resource management. Conversely, we find that bidding occurred at the individual farmer level as well. This difference in approach depends on the extent of the auction coordinators’ commitment to the auction, reflected by their risk evaluation of unsuccessful bids. In either case, the auction coordinators could manage to minimize the likely unfairness arising from the auction.Although establishing a competitive environment to prevent possible collusion in such auctions is challenging, this study provides empirical evidence that collective action in pre-existing local resource management can reduce auction transaction costs. Utilizing local communities’ abilities to organize collective action can reduce these costs and minimize the possible unfairness arising from the auction, thus facilitating compatibility between cost-effective conservation owing to the auction and local resource conservation by collective action.Finally, we suggest that (1) the transaction cost of such an auction could be reduced by allotting adequate time for collective decision making, and (2) conservation programs should be designed to minimize their impact on production bases.