Security analysis of Anti-SAT
Security analysis of Anti-SAT
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DOI：
10.1109/aspdac.2017.7858346
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Muhammad Yasin;Bodhisatwa Mazumdar;O. Sinanoglu;Jeyavijayan Rajendran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Muhammad Yasin;Bodhisatwa Mazumdar;O. Sinanoglu;Jeyavijayan Rajendran
逻辑加密通过用键加密IC来保护综合电路（IC）免受知识产权（IP）盗版和过度建筑攻击。布尔值满意度（基于SAT）的攻击在几个小时内打破了所有现有的逻辑加密技术。最近，提出了一种称为抗SAT的防御机制，该机制通过根据关键大门的数量进行卫星攻击的努力来防止SAT攻击。在本文中，我们强调了抗SAT的脆弱性，并提出了信号概率偏斜（SPS）对抗SAT阻滞的攻击。 SPS攻击利用抗SAT块中的结构迹线来识别和分离抗SAT块。攻击在抗SAT块的所有变体上都是100％成功的。 SPS攻击可扩展到大型电路，因为它会在两分钟内打破高达22k大门的电路。
Logic encryption protects integrated circuits (ICs) against intellectual property (IP) piracy and overbuilding attacks by encrypting the IC with a key. A Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attack breaks all existing logic encryption technique within few hours. Recently, a defense mechanism known as Anti-SAT was presented that protects against SAT attack, by rendering the SAT-attack effort exponential in terms of the number of key gates. In this paper, we highlight the vulnerabilities of Anti-SAT and propose signal probability skew (SPS) attack against Anti-SAT block. SPS attack leverages the structural traces in Anti-SAT block to identify and isolate Anti-SAT block. The attack is 100% successful on all variants of Anti-SAT block. SPS attack is scalable to large circuits, as it breaks circuits with up to 22K gates within two minutes.