Risk and quality control in a supply chain: competitive and collaborative approaches
Risk and quality control in a supply chain: competitive and collaborative approaches
复制标题
供应链中的风险和质量控制：竞争和协作方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
K. Kogan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Tapiero;K. Kogan
本文使用随机支付博弈，为由一个供应商和一个生产商组成的供应链中的战略质量控制提供了一种定量和比较的经济和风险方法。这种博弈首先在风险中性框架中通过假设双方相互竞争来解决。我们在这种情况下表明，检查博弈可能存在一个内部解决方案。协作框架下的类似分析被证明是微不足道且不切实际的，检查博弈的解决方案对于所涉及的一方或双方来说是“全有或全无”的解决方案。由于这些原因，抽样随机支付博弈被转化为内曼-皮尔逊风险约束博弈，其中各方在一组内曼-皮尔逊风险（I 型和 II 型）约束下最小化预期成本。在这种情况下，潜在平衡的数量可能很大。开发了许多此类解决方案，并通过为协作案例提供内部（部分采样）解决方案提出了实用（凸）方法。开发数值示例来演示所使用的程序。因此，与解决战略质量控制随机收益博弈的理论方法不同，我们构建的方法既实用又与统计风险内曼-皮尔逊方法一致。
This paper provides a quantitative and comparative economic and risk approach to strategic quality control in a supply chain, consisting of one supplier and one producer, using a random payoff game. Such a game is first solved in a risk-neutral framework by assuming that both parties are competing with each other. We show in this case that there may be an interior solution to the inspection game. A similar analysis under a collaborative framework is shown to be trivial and not practical, with a solution to the inspection game being an ‘all or nothing’ solution to one or both the parties involved. For these reasons, the sampling random payoff game is transformed into a Neyman–Pearson risk constraints game, where the parties minimize the expected costs subject to a set of Neyman–Pearson risk (type I and type II) constraints. In this case, the number of potential equilibria can be large. A number of such solutions are developed and a practical (convex) approach is suggested by providing an interior (partial sampling) solution for the collaborative case. Numerical examples are developed to demonstrate the procedure used. Thus, unlike theoretical approaches to the solution of strategic quality control random payoff games, the approach we construct is both practical and consistent with the statistical risk Neyman–Pearson approach.