Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation
Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation
复制标题
具有垂直产品差异化的双头垄断中价格和数量策略的盈利能力
DOI：
10.1007/pl00004124
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry, there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition (their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game, a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
