A DYNAMIC GAME OF R AND D: PATENT PROTECTION AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR'
A DYNAMIC GAME OF R AND D: PATENT PROTECTION AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR'
复制标题
研发的动态博弈：专利保护和竞争行为”
DOI：
10.2307/1912607
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Jennifer F. Reinganum
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jennifer F. Reinganum
本文利用微分对策方法建立了n个企业的R和D资源动态最优配置理论。这种技术代表了以前应用于问题的分析方法的综合：静态博弈论和最优控制。使用特定的功能形式允许计算和详细讨论的纳什均衡的投资规则。本文讨论研究与发展的资源分配问题。从事研究和开发的公司必须评估的重要问题包括：某一创新的可行性和盈利性的不确定性;开发期延长的可能性;竞争公司可能首先创新，获得专利或新市场的重要份额的可能性;竞争对手可能会模仿创新，并在新市场中占有部分利润。在下文中，我们将发展一个研究与开发的最佳资源分配理论，其中包括上面列举的研究与开发方面。我们将使用动态博弈论分析，确定n个相同企业的纳什均衡策略。完善的专利保护的可用性，以加速创新的发展，并解决日益激烈的竞争的影响。竞争加剧对研发投资纳什均衡的影响取决于报酬的可支配性程度。如果专利保护是完美的，那么增加纳什竞争对手的数量会增加研发努力。然而，当模仿得到奖励时，情况可能正好相反。最后，我们将在下面的模型中考察竞争均衡和完全竞争均衡的一些概念。
A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules. THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM of resource allocation to research and development. Among the important issues that a firm engaging in R and D must evaluate are: uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation; the possibility of a protracted development period; the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first, capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market; the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market. In what follows, we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of R and D enumerated above. We will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis, determining the Nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms. The availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation, and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed. The impact of increasing rivalry on Nash equilibrium investment in R and D depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards. If patent protection is perfect, then increasing the number of Nash rivals results in increased R and D effort. However, when imitation is rewarded, the opposite may be true. Finally, some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below.