StealthyIMU: Stealing Permission-protected Private Information From Smartphone Voice Assistant Using Zero-Permission Sensors
StealthyIMU: Stealing Permission-protected Private Information From Smartphone Voice Assistant Using Zero-Permission Sensors
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DOI：
10.14722/ndss.2023.24077
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ke Sun;C. Xia;Songlin Xu;Xinyu Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ke Sun;C. Xia;Songlin Xu;Xinyu Zhang
语音用户界面（VUIs）正在成为一个不可或缺的模块，它使人类用户和智能手机之间能够进行免提交互。不幸的是，最近的研究揭示了一种侧信道，该信道允许零权限运动传感器从位于同一位置的智能手机扬声器窃听VUI语音。然而，这些威胁仅限于泄露少量数字和热点词汇。在本文中，我们提出了StealthyIMU，这是一种新的威胁，它利用运动传感器从VUIs窃取受权限保护的私人信息。我们开发了一组高效的模型来检测和提取私人信息，利用了VUI响应中的确定性结构。我们的实验表明，StealthyIMU能够从23种常用语音命令中窃取私人信息，以高精度获取联系人、搜索历史、日历、家庭住址，甚至GPS轨迹。我们还提出了有效的机制来防御StealthyIMU，同时不会对用户体验产生显著影响。
—Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) are becoming an indispensable module that enables hands-free interaction between human users and smartphones. Unfortunately, recent research revealed a side channel that allows zero-permission motion sensors to eavesdrop on the VUI voices from the co-located smartphone loudspeaker. Nonetheless, these threats are limited to leaking a small set of digits and hot words. In this paper, we propose StealthyIMU, a new threat that uses motion sensors to steal permission-protected private information from the VUIs. We develop a set of efficient models to detect and extract private information, taking advantage of the deterministic structures in the VUI responses. Our experiments show that StealthyIMU can steal private information from 23 types of frequently-used voice commands to acquire contacts, search history, calendar, home address, and even GPS trace with high accuracy. We further propose effective mechanisms to defend against StealthyIMU without noticeably impacting the user experience.