An investigation on information leakage of DNS over TLS
An investigation on information leakage of DNS over TLS
复制标题
DNS over TLS信息泄露调查
DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Haining Wang
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Rebekah Houser;Zhou Li;Chase Cotton;Haining Wang
DNS over TLS (DoT) protects the confidentiality and integrity of DNS communication by encrypting DNS messages transmitted between users and resolvers. In recent years, DoT has been deployed by popular recursive resolvers like Cloudflare and Google. While DoT is supposed to prevent on-path adversaries from learning and tampering with victims' DNS requests and responses, it is unclear how much information can be deduced through traffic analysis on DoT messages. To answer this question, in this work, we develop a DoT fingerprinting method to analyze DoT traffic and determine if a user has visited websites of interest to adversaries. Given that a visit to a website typically introduces a sequence of DNS packets, we can infer the visited websites by modeling the temporal patterns of packet sizes. Our method can identify DoT traffic for websites with a false negative rate of less than 17% and a false positive rate of less than 0.5% when DNS messages are not padded. Moreover, we show that information leakage is still possible even when DoT messages are padded. These findings highlight the challenges of protecting DNS privacy, and indicate the necessity of a thorough analysis of the threats underlying DNS communications for effective defenses.
DOI:
10.1145/3243734.3243832
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
影响因子:
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作者:
Li, Shuai;Guo, Huajun;Hopper, Nicholas
通讯作者:
Hopper, Nicholas
DOI:
10.1145/3355369.3355568
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ACM Interent Measurements Conference
影响因子:
--
作者:
Moura, Giovane C.;Heidemann, John;Schmidt, Ricardo de;Hardaker, Wes
通讯作者:
Hardaker, Wes