The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5
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发表时间：
2021-10
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Takehito Masuda;Ryo Mikami;Toyotaka Sakai;Shigehiro Serizawa;Takuma Wakayama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takehito Masuda;Ryo Mikami;Toyotaka Sakai;Shigehiro Serizawa;Takuma Wakayama
我们为多单位维克瑞拍卖进行了实验室实验，没有向受试者提供关于防策略的建议。在没有接受建议的受试者中，说真话的比例保持在20%，而在接受过建议的受试者中，这一比例上升到47%。通过对Pay-Your-Bid拍卖进行类似的实验，我们证实了说真话的增加显著地归因于网络建议效应(即超出所谓的实验者需求效应的效应)。此外，我们发现，在Vickrey拍卖中，提供建议可以提高效率，特别是在拍卖人缺乏经验的早期阶段。总体而言，在维克瑞拍卖实验中，受试者往往出价过高。我们的结果表明，通过提供简单的建议，通过促进对Vickrey拍卖的防策略的更好理解，减少这种过度出价的可能性。防策略机制有时会受到批评，因为玩家往往没有意识到说实话的好处。然而，我们的观察表明，引入关于防策略属性的建议有助于他们表现得“正确”。
We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auctionwithandwithoutadvice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice stays at 20%, whereas the rate increases to 47% among those who have received advice. By conducting similar experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, we confirm that the increase in truth-telling is due significantly to thenet advice effect(i.e., the effect beyond the so-called experimenter demand effect). Moreover, we find that providing advice improves efficiency in the Vickrey auction, particularly in the early periods, when the subjects are less experienced. In general, subjects tend to overbid in Vickrey auction experiments. Our results indicate the possibility that providing simple advice decreases such overbidding by promoting a better understanding of the strategy-proofness of the Vickrey auction. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to recognize the benefit of telling the truth. However, our observations show that introducing advice on the property of strategy-proofness helps them behave “correctly.”