Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds ?
Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds ?
复制标题
反事实真的可以与可能的世界有关吗？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00810.x
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Barker S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barker S
关于反事实的标准观点是，当且仅当与现实世界最相似的 A 世界是 C 世界时，反事实 (A>C) 才是正确的。我认为世界上的反事实概念是错误的。我假设反事实在物理决定论下具有不平凡的真值。我表明，可能世界方法无法解释 (P> (Q>R)) 形式的许多嵌入，这些嵌入直观上是完全可以断言的，并且如果要解释 (Q>R) 的偶然错误，则它必须是正确的。如果 (P> (Q>R)) 具有回溯读数，那么在最近的 P 世界中 (Q>R) 需要为真的偶然事实就不存在。如果 (P> (Q>R)) 具有前向跟踪读数，则 (Q>R) 所要求的在最近的 P 世界中为真的定律将不存在，因为它们在这些世界中被违反。像有损定律或拒绝嵌入这样的解决方案是行不通的。解释嵌入的反事实的唯一方法是实用元语言方法，其中反事实是关于模态现实（无论是抽象的还是具体的）的整个想法被放弃。
The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A>C) is true if and only if theA‐worlds most similar to the actual world @ areC‐worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non‐trivial truth‐values under physical determinism. I show that the possible‐worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P> (Q>R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity of (Q>R) is to be explained. If (P> (Q>R)) has a backtracking reading then the contingent facts that (Q>R) needs to be true in the closestP‐worlds are absent. If (P> (Q>R)) has a forwardtracking reading, then the laws required by (Q>R) to be true in the closestP‐worlds will be absent, because they are violated in those worlds. Solutions like lossy laws or denial of embedding won't work. The only approach to counterfactuals that explains the embedding is a pragmatic metalinguistic approach in which the whole idea that counterfactuals are about a modal reality, be it abstract or concrete, is given up.