Cournot Duopoly and Environmental R&D Under Regulator's Precommitment to an Emissions Tax
Cournot Duopoly and Environmental R&D Under Regulator's Precommitment to an Emissions Tax
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2447685
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发表时间：
2014-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
本文研究了在监管机构对排放税的预先承诺下，古诺双寡头企业采用末端技术的环境研发。研究结果表明，在存在技术溢出效应的情况下，政府总是倾向于环境R & D卡特尔而不是环境R & D竞争。此外，与早期研究形成鲜明对比的是，本文揭示了环境研究合资企业（ERJV）卡特尔化不一定能最大化消费者剩余，尽管企业总是存在ERJV卡特尔化的私人激励以及社会激励。
This paper presents examination of environmental R&D of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax. Results show that, in the presence of technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers environmental R&D cartelization to environmental R&D competition. In addition, this paper, in stark contrast to those presenting earlier studies, reveals that consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization, although there invariably exist private incentives to firms for ERJV cartelization as well as social incentives for it.