A Differential Fault Attack Technique against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES and KHAZAD
A Differential Fault Attack Technique against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES and KHAZAD
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_7
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发表时间：
2003-09
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通讯作者：
G. Piret;J. Quisquater
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文献类型：
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作者：
G. Piret;J. Quisquater
在本文中，我们描述了一个差分故障攻击技术的替代置换网络，并需要很少的错误密文。使用的故障模型是现实的，因为我们考虑影响字节的随机故障（影响一个比特的故障更难诱导）。我们在AES和Khazad的PC上实施了攻击。我们能够破解AES-128只有2个错误的密文，假设故障发生在倒数第三和倒数第二个MixColumn之间;这比以前对AES的故障攻击更好[6][10][11]。在类似的假设下，Khazadis可以用3个错误的密文破解。
In this paper we describe a differential fault attack technique working against Substitution-Permutation Networks, and requiring very few faulty ciphertexts. The fault model used is realistic, as we consider random faults affecting bytes (faults affecting one only bit are much harder to induce). We implemented our attack on a PC for both the AES andKhazad. We are able to break the AES-128 with only 2 faulty ciphertexts, assuming the fault occurs between the antepenultimate and the penultimate MixColumn; this is better than the previous fault attacks against AES [6][10][11]. Under similar hypothesis,Khazadis breakable with 3 faulty ciphertexts.