Japan's Political Leadership Deficit

Japan's Political Leadership Deficit
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日本的政治领导力赤字

DOI:
10.1080/713649327
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发表时间:
2000
影响因子:
1.2
通讯作者:
Aurelia George Mulgan
Aurelia George Mulgan
中科院分区:
法学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Aurelia George Mulgan

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分析人士长期以来一直在思考这样一个问题:谁统治日本?行使强有力领导的首相一直是例外,而不是规则。尽管人们普遍承认,日本政治领导力的缺失削弱了政府在危机中迅速采取行动、在贸易和外交政策上发挥国际领导力的能力,但对于日本政治执行力薄弱的原因,还没有提出系统的解释。虽然不能忽视历史和文化因素,但在当代背景下,更相关的是限制总理和内阁权力的体制因素。议会内阁制与强有力的领导并不矛盾,但在日本的情况下,政治行政部门无法行使无可争辩的权力,或者实际上只是行使首相和内阁府的合法特权,这直接归因于执政的保守党内部的一系列非正式权力结构和自治的中央官僚机构施加的限制,所有这些都使权力远离政治行政部门。目前正在寻求各种体制补救办法,以加强行政部门的领导。他们是刻意策划的权力转移的一部分,从非选举产生的官僚到选举产生的政治家。这些改革还将有助于减少执政党派系对行政机关人事选择的影响,以及党内政策派系在党内决策中的主导地位。
Analysts have long pondered the question: 'Who rules in Japan?'. Prime Ministers who have exercised strong leadership have been the exception rather than the rule. Despite the widespread acknowledgment that Japan's political leadership deficit undermines the ability of the government to act swiftly in a crisis and to exercise international leadership in trade and foreign policy, a systematic explanation for Japan's weak political executive is yet to be advanced. While historical and cultural factors cannot be ignored, more relevant in a contemporary context are institutional factors that restrict the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. A parliamentary Cabinet system is not incompatible with strong leadership but, in Japan's case, the inability of the political executive to exercise indisputable authority, or indeed, merely to exercise the legitimate prerogatives of Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Office, is directly attributable to the constraints imposed by a collection of informal power structures within the ruling conservative party and by an autonomous central bureaucracy, all of which have held power away from the political executive. Various institutional remedies are currently being pursued to enhance the leadership of the executive branch. They are part of a deliberately engineered shift in power from non-elected bureaucrats to elected politicians. The reforms will also help to diminish the influence of ruling party factions over personnel selections to executive office and the ascendancy of internal policy cliques within party policymaking.