Territorial Acquisition, Commitment, and Recurrent War
Territorial Acquisition, Commitment, and Recurrent War
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领土获取、承诺和反复战争
DOI：
10.1093/irap/lcy001
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Shoko Kohama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shoko Kohama
本研究探讨了通过战争获取领土如何影响连续停火的持久性，并确定了什么类型的领土获取更不利于战后和平。尽管有大量关于经常性战争和领土的文献，但领土获取对战争恢复的影响一直没有得到充分研究。这项研究表明，领土收购的对手之间的未来的权力转移，从而导致一个承诺的问题，阻碍和平修改现有的停火之间的期望。事实上，对第二次世界大战以来国家间战争后停火的持续时间分析表明，战争中的领土变化，特别是对具有更大权力转移潜在效用的大片人口稠密领土的获取，使停火更容易失败。对中越在陆地和海上边界军事化事件后停火的分析也说明了领土获取的重要性和领土的潜在用途。
This study investigates how territorial acquisition through war affects the durability of a successive ceasefire and determines what type of territorial acquisition is more detrimental to post-war peace. Despite the wealth of literature on recurrent war and on territory, the effect of territorial acquisition on war resumption has been understudied. This study shows that territorial acquisition creates expectations among adversaries for future power shifts, which results in a commitment problem that hinders peaceful revision of the existing ceasefire. Indeed, duration analysis of ceasefires following interstate wars since World War II shows that territorial change in war, especially acquisition of large and densely populated territories that have potential utility for greater power shifts, makes ceasefires more prone to failure. The analysis of Sino-Vietnamese ceasefires following militarized incidents over land and sea borders also illustrates the importance of territorial acquisition and the potential utility of the territory.