Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization
Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization
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斯宾诺莎与归化政治
DOI：
10.1093/isle/iss040
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Husband
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Husband
对夏普和她的“再自然化”概念特别重要的是斯宾诺莎的“自然主义”。他的同时伦理和政治的自然哲学假定，“[h] umanity接收没有特殊的形而上学的价值和没有特权的地方在性质”（1）。换句话说，它“否认任何形式的人类例外论”（1）。因此，人类必须重新回归到斯宾诺莎的线条、平面和身体的无等级竞技场。这种特别的后人类主义倾向助长了这本书的大部分内容，夏普不仅与斯宾诺莎的哲学著作，而且与他最著名的（错误的）读者，其中最重要的是黑格尔和德勒兹。最终，哲学人文主义的主题，特别是在其当代伪装为自由人文主义，来占领夏普的持续批评。可以理解的是，这似乎是一个很大的材料消化。这本书跨越了西方大陆哲学的历史，从斯宾诺莎到黑格尔，再到德勒兹，然后以一种最初可能显得笨重和难以理解的方式返回。然而，夏普导航大量的，有时不稳定的地形哲学调查与熟练的感觉，时间和主题的组织，使这些问题访问，即使是最不倾向于哲学。她组织斯宾诺莎和重新自然化的政治两部分：“重新配置的人”和“超越人的形象。”正如这些标题所表明的那样，夏普首先解释了斯宾诺莎对人类的非人文主义概念化，然后超越了它进入了后人类的领域。这条轨迹的中心点从第一页就很明显：为了改善其社会和环境组成部分，制定一个可能的再自然化政治项目（或多个项目）。或者，更确切地说，是为了证明这种错误的区分在人类和非人类的伦理和政治生活中可能产生的令人沮丧的影响和后果。对夏普来说，再自然化“建立了一种新的认识，即我们作为自然的一部分，按照与其他一切事物相同的规则运作，总是依赖于许多其他存在物，人类和非人类”（5）。与此同时，夏普对斯宾诺莎的解释警告说，在环境学家和深层生态学家的更大社区中，许多人表现出反人道主义，因为“幻想人类可以自愿限制他们对非人类本性的影响......是一个完美的人道主义野心的前提下，经验错误的人类例外论”（219）。
Of particular importance to Sharp and her concept of “renaturalization” is Spinoza's “naturalism.” His simultaneously ethical and political philosophy of nature posits that “[h] umanity receives no special metaphysical value and no privileged place in nature”(1). In other words, it “denies human exceptionalism in any form”(1). The human must therefore be re-naturalized into the nonhierarchical arena of Spinoza's lines, planes, and bodies. This particularly posthumanist bent fuels the majority of the book, in which Sharp grapples not only with Spinoza's philosophical writings but also with his most famous (mis) readers, foremost among them GWF Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. Ultimately, the subject of philosophical humanism—especially in its contemporary guise as liberal humanism—comes to occupy Sharp's ongoing critique. Understandably, this seems like a lot of material to digest. The book leaps through the history of western continental philosophy, moving from Spinoza to Hegel to Deleuze and back in a manner that may initially appear cumbersome and unintelligible. However, Sharp navigates the voluminous and sometimes volatile terrain of philosophical inquiry with an adept sense of chronological and thematic organization that renders these matters accessible to even the least philosophically inclined. She organizes Spinoza and the Politics ofRenaturalization in two parts:“Reconfiguration of the Human” and “Beyond the Image of Man.” As these titles indicate, Sharp first interprets Spinoza's nonhumanist conceptualization of the human and then moves beyond it to the realm of the posthuman. The central point of this trajectory is evident from the first pages: to lay out the possible project (or projects) of a politics of renaturalization for the betterment of its social and environmental components. Or, rather, to demonstrate the frustrating implications and effects that such an erroneous distinction can have in human and nonhuman ethical and political life. For Sharp, renaturalization “founds a new appreciation of ourselves as parts of nature, operating according to the same rules as everything else, invariably dependent upon many other beings, human and nonhuman”(5). At the same time, Sharp's interpretation of Spinoza warns against the antihumanism evinced by many in the larger community of environmentalists and deep ecologists, for “[t] he fantasy that humans could voluntarily circumscribe the effects they have on nonhuman nature... is a perfectly humanist ambition predicated on empirically false human exceptionalism”(219).