Inspection games in arms control
Inspection games in arms control
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军控检查游戏
DOI：
10.1016/0377-2217(95)00261-8
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Zamir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Avenhaus;M. Canty;D. Kilgour;B. Stengel;S. Zamir
视察博弈是视察员核查被视察方遵守某种法律的义务的情况的数学模型，如军备控制条约，而被视察方可能有兴趣违反该义务。数学分析旨在确定一个最佳的检查方案，理想的情况下，这将导致法律的行为，假设潜在的非法行为进行战略，从而与两个球员，检查员和被检查者的非合作博弈，被定义。在军备控制和裁军方面应用这种模式的发展可分为三个阶段。在第一个阶段，大约从1961年到1968年，研究重点是检查核禁试条约，强调博弈论，较少考虑与数据采集和测量不确定性相关的统计方面。第二阶段从1968年到大约1985年，涉及《不扩散核武器条约》（《不扩散条约》）推动的工作。在这里，材料会计的验证原则走到了前面，沿着需要在检查模型中包括统计决策理论的形式主义。1985年至今的第三阶段主要是《中程核力量协定》、《欧洲常规武装力量条约》和《化学武器公约》等影响深远的核查协定所带来的挑战，以及人们认为《不扩散条约》制度在伊拉克和北朝鲜的失败。在这方面，正在从博弈论的角度审查核查的政治和技术方面之间的相互关系。
An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that the potential illegal action is carried out strategically; thus a non-cooperative game with two players, inspector and inspectee, is defined. Three phases of development in the application of such models to arms control and disarmament may be identified. In the first of these, roughly from 1961 through 1968, studies that focused on inspecting a nuclear test ban treaty emphasized game theory, with less consideration given to statistical aspects associated with data acquisition and measurement uncertainty. The second phase, from 1968 to about 1985, involves work stimulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Here, the verification principle of material accountancy came to the fore, along with the need to include the formalism of statistical decision theory within the inspection models. The third phase, 1985 to the present, has been dominated by challenges posed by such far-reaching verification agreements as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as perceived failures of the NPT system in Iraq and North Korea. In this connection, the interface between the political and technical aspects of verification is being examined from the game-theoretic viewpoint.