Deontic logic (adapted) for normative conflicts
Deontic logic (adapted) for normative conflicts
复制标题
用于规范冲突的道义逻辑（改编）
作者：
L. Goble
规范性冲突是指一个主体应该做几件事中的每一件，但不能做全部的情况。它们似乎是每个人生活中太频繁的一部分。然而标准道义逻辑宣称它们在逻辑上是不可能的。因此，我们希望调整标准原则，以发展一种能够容纳这种冲突的规范概念逻辑。在这里，我提出了规范冲突所带来的问题，以及它看起来有多么困难。然后，我介绍了一些应用自适应逻辑框架来解决这个问题的有希望的新结果。然而，我最后对这些结果进行了批判性的审视，并质疑它们是否足够。
Normative conflicts are situations in which an agent ought to do each of several things but cannot do them all. They seem an all too frequent part of anyone’s life. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. Hence we look to adapt the standard principles to develop a logic of normative concepts that can accommodate such conflicts. Here I present the problem posed by normative conflicts, and how difficult it seems to be. I then introduce some promising new results that apply the framework of Adaptive Logic to this problem. I close, however, with a critical look at those results, and question how adequate they are.