How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles?
How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles?
复制标题
货币政策应如何应对资产价格泡沫？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andrew Stone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Gruen;Michael Plumb;Andrew Stone
我们提出了一个简单的宏观经济模型，其中包括资产价格泡沫的作用，并得出两个政策制定者的最优货币政策设置。第一个政策制定者是一个怀疑论者，在制定政策时，他并不试图预测资产价格泡沫未来的可能路径。第二个政策制定者，一个积极分子，在制定政策时考虑到泡沫的完全随机含义。我们研究了这两个政策制定者在一系列关于泡沫的合理假设下的最优政策建议。我们发现，最优的货币政策建议的积极分子取决于详细的随机属性的泡沫。在某些情况下，激进主义者明确建议比怀疑论者更严格的政策，而在其他情况下，适当的建议是比怀疑论者更宽松。在其他条件相同的情况下，泡沫雅阁破裂的概率越低，与大泡沫相关的效率损失越大，货币政策对泡沫过程的假设影响越大，货币政策“倾向于”泡沫的理由就越强。
We present a simple model of the macroeconomy that includes a role for an asset-price bubble, and derive optimal monetary policy settings for two policy-makers. The first policy-maker, a sceptic, does not attempt to forecast the future possible paths for the asset-price bubble when setting policy. The second policy-maker, an activist, takes into account the complete stochastic implications of the bubble when setting policy. We examine the optimal policy recommendations of these two policy-makers across a range of plausible assumptions about the bubble. We show that the optimal monetary policy recommendations of the activist depend on the detailed stochastic properties of the bubble. There are some circumstances in which the activist clearly recommends tighter policy than that of the sceptic, while in other cases, the appropriate recommendation is to be looser than the sceptic. Other things equal, the case for ‘leaning against’ a bubble with monetary policy is stronger the lower the probability of the bubble bursting of its own accord, the larger the efficiency losses associated with big bubbles, and the higher the assumed impact of monetary policy on the bubble process.