Agnostic hyperintensional semantics
Agnostic hyperintensional semantics
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不可知的超内涵语义
作者：
C. Pollard
提出了一种自然语言的超内涵语义，它对命题是世界集还是世界是（最大相容）命题集的问题是不可知的。蒙塔古的内涵意义理论被一个较弱的理论所取代，这个理论是用标准的经典高阶逻辑写成的，是关于与内涵多对一对应的细粒度意义的;蒙塔古的理论可以从所提出的理论中恢复出来，方法是把命题的类型和世界的集合的类型区分开来，并增加一个公理，大意是每个世界都是在那里为真的命题的集合。基于直觉主义线性命题逻辑的蕴涵片段，通过只有两个规则图式的范畴语法将意义成分地分配给语言表达式，并且提供了一个完全明确的语法片段，该语法片段说明了意义成分分配给各种结构，包括虚拟主语结构，不定式补语，谓词形容词和名词，提升到主语，'tough-movement'，和量词作用域歧义。值得注意的是，它所许可的语法和派生从来不涉及世界或意义的延伸。
A hyperintensional semantics for natural language is proposed which is agnostic about the question of whether propositions are sets of worlds or worlds are (maximal consistent) sets of propositions. Montague’s theory of intensional senses is replaced by a weaker theory, written in standard classical higher-order logic, of fine-grained senses which are in a many-to-one correspondence with intensions; Montague’s theory can then be recovered from the proposed theory by identifying the type of propositions with the type of sets of worlds and adding an axiom to the effect that each world is the set of propositions which are true there. Senses are compositionally assigned to linguistic expressions by a categorial grammar with only two rule schemas, based on the implicative fragment of intuitionistic linear propositional logic, and a fully explicit grammar fragment is provided that illustrates the compositional assignment of sense to a variety of constructions, including dummy-subject constructions, infinitive complements, predicative adjectives and nominals, raising to subject, ‘tough-movement’, and quantifier scope ambiguities. Notably, the grammar and the derivations that it licenses never make reference to either worlds or to the extensions of senses.