The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework
The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework
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联邦制制度：走向分析框架
DOI：
10.17310/ntj.2004.2.06
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
D. Wildasin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Wildasin
成熟的联邦在各级政府之间有相对透明的权力划分;国家以下各级政府在支出、收入和债务政策方面享有相当大的自主权。在其他国家，软预算约束、救助以及财政和金融不稳定的问题表明了联邦制度设计的困难。本文概述了一个分析框架，在这个框架内，管辖区间的溢出效应可能会激励上级政府干预下级政府的控制和融资（“救助”）。这一框架有助于确定理论和实证研究的方向，这些研究可以阐明所观察到的制度的重要特征，并指导政策分析。
Mature federations have relatively transparent delineations of authority among levels of government; subnational governments enjoy considerable autonomy in their expenditure, revenue, and debt policies. In other countnes, problems of soft budget constraints, bailouts, and fiscal and financial instability demonstrate the difficulties of institutional design in a federation. This paper outlines an analytical framework within which interjurisdictional spillovers may create incentives for higher-level governments to intervene in the control and financing of lower-level governments ("bailouts"). This framework helps to identify directions for theoretical and empirical research that can illuminate important features of observed institutions and guide policy analysis.