Affect and the weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations
Affect and the weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations
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DOI：
10.1002/ejsp.2164
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发表时间：
2016-04-01
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Bless, Herbert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Burger, Axel M.;Bless, Herbert
个人认为抽象的价值观和原则是他们身份的重要方面。然而，为了实际利益，他们经常做出与这些价值观和原则相矛盾的判断和决定。假设对理想主义和实用主义关注的加权过程是上下文敏感的，本研究认为，影响影响决策情境中理想主义和实用主义关注的相对权重，因为它影响个人在心理上表征情境的抽象水平。研究1和研究2表明，积极情感的增加增加了理想主义关注对语用关注的显著权重，而积极情感的减少导致理想主义关注和语用关注之间相关性的差异减小。研究3和4检验了对心理抽象的情感影响对于理想主义和实用主义关注权重的情感依赖转移至关重要的假设。通过将情感和认知的理论与最近关于心理抽象在决策过程中的作用的理论结合起来，本文强调了一种机制，通过这种机制，决策可以受到情感的影响，这超出了迄今为止情感和认知文献中典型讨论的机制。
Individuals consider abstract values and principles important aspects of their identities. Nonetheless, they often make judgments and decisions that contradict these values and principles for the sake of pragmatic benefits. Assuming that the process of weighting idealistic and pragmatic concerns is context sensitive, the present research argues that affect influences the relative weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations owing to its influence on the level of abstraction at which individuals represent situations mentally. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that more positive affect increases the prominent weighting of idealistic over pragmatic concerns while less positive affect leads to less differentiation between the relevance of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. Studies 3 and 4 test the assumption that affective influences on mental abstraction are crucial for affect-dependent shifts in the weighting of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. By bringing together theorizing on affect and cognition with recent theorizing on the role of mental abstraction for decision processes, this article highlights a mechanism through which decisions can be influenced by feelings that goes beyond the mechanisms that have typically been discussed in the affect and cognition literature so far.