Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
复制标题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Bagwell;B. Bernheim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Bagwell;B. Bernheim
作者研究了“凡勃伦效应”产生的条件，即人们希望通过炫耀性消费来彰显财富，从而获得社会地位。当偏好满足“单交叉属性”时，通常不会出现凡勃伦效应，但当该属性不满足时，就可能出现凡勃伦效应。在这种情况下，“预算”品牌的定价是边际成本，而“奢侈”品牌虽然本质上并不优越，但却以更高的价格出售给那些想要标榜自己富有的消费者。奢侈品牌在一定条件下获得严格的正利润，按照标准的偏好公式，这些条件将产生边际成本定价。作者探讨了诱发凡勃伦效应的因素，并研究了政策影响。版权归美国经济学会所有。
The authors examine conditions under which 'Veblen effects' arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption. While Veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a 'single-crossing property,' they may emerge when this property fails. In that case, 'budget' brands are priced at marginal cost, while 'luxury' brands, though not intrinsically superior, are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth. Luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would, with standard formulations of preferences, yield marginal-cost pricing. The authors explore factors that induce Veblen effects and they investigate policy implications. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.