Confidence analysis for nuclear arms control: SMT abstractions of Game Theoretic Models
Confidence analysis for nuclear arms control: SMT abstractions of Game Theoretic Models
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核军控置信度分析：博弈论模型的 SMT 抽象
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Plant
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Huth;Paul Beaumont;Neil Evans;T. Plant
我们考虑在军备控制视察规划方案中使用博弈论。具体来说，我们开发了一个案例研究，游戏的检查数量对一个理想的条约长度。正常的博弈论技术努力证明支付值用于某些事件，限制了这种技术的有用性。为了提高利用博弈论进行决策的价值，我们引入了一种方法，通过回归技术和可满足性模理论（SMT）约束求解程序的混合物下指定的博弈论模型。我们的方法允许用户在游戏中指定的支付，并检查，以类似于强大的优化的方式，这种规格下如何影响游戏的“解决方案”。我们分析的纳什均衡和混合策略集，将导致这样的均衡，并探讨如何最大限度地提高预期的回报和使用个人纯策略的所有可能的值下规格。通过这种方法，我们可以深入了解如何不考虑不确定性，我们仍然可以用博弈论模型计算，并提出我们可以从这种不确定性中受益的分析类型和种类。
We consider the use of game theory in an arms control inspection planning scenario. Specifically we develop a case study that games the number of inspections available against an ideal treaty length. Normal game theoretic techniques struggle to justify pay-off values to use for certain events, limiting the usefulness of such techniques. In order to improve the value of using game theory for decision making, we introduce a methodology for under-specifying the game theoretic models through a mixture of regression techniques and Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) constraint solving programs. Our approach allows a user to under-specify pay-offs in games, and to check, in a manner akin to robust optimisation, for how such under-specifications affect the ‘solution’ of a game. We analyse the Nash equilibria and the mixed strategy sets that would lead to such equilibria and explore how to maximise expected pay-offs and use of individual pure strategies for all possible values of an under-specification. Through this approach, we gain an insight into how irrespective of uncertainty we can still compute with game theoretic models, and present the types and kinds of analysis we can run that benefit from this uncertainty.