Social Efficiency of Entry with Market Leaders
Social Efficiency of Entry with Market Leaders
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进入市场领导者的社会效率
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Mukherjee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Mukherjee
我们通过考虑一个具有数量设定领导者和追随者自由进入的行业，为进入的社会效率提供了一个新的视角。我们表明，是否自由进入一个同质产品是社会过度或不足取决于领导者的身份（这是国内或国外），领导者和追随者之间的边际成本差异，以及是否有规模经济。在封闭经济中，如果领导者和追随者之间的边际成本差异很小（很大），则在规模经济存在的情况下，进入社会过度（不足），但没有规模经济，进入总是社会不足。在一个有外国领导人的开放经济中，进入总是不足以产生社会影响。我们的研究结果表明，反竞争进入管制政策的关注，以前的文献显示，社会过度进入古诺寡头同质产品和完全竞争的投入部门。
We offer a new respective to the social efficiency of entry by considering an industry with a quantity setting leader and free entry of followers. We show that whether free entry with a homogeneous product is socially excessive or insufficient depends on the identity of the leader (which is either domestic or foreign), the marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers, and whether there are scale economies. In a closed economy, entry is socially excessive (insufficient) in the presence of scale economies if the marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers is small (large), but without scale economies, entry is always socially insufficient. In an open economy with the foreign leader, entry is always socially insufficient. Our results show concern to the anti-competitive entry regulation policies following the previous literature showing socially excessive entry in Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and perfectly competitive input sector.