Unit-Contingent Power Purchase Agreement and Asymmetric Information about Plant Outage
Unit-Contingent Power Purchase Agreement and Asymmetric Information about Plant Outage
复制标题
机组或有购电协议与电厂停电信息不对称
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1326438
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Babich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Owen Q. Wu;V. Babich
本文分析了电力分销商与发电厂之间的单位或有购电协议。根据这样的合同，如果工厂运行，经销商将向工厂支付固定价格，如果工厂停电，经销商则无需支付任何费用。由于工厂的真实状态是其私人信息，因此单位或有合同的定价变得复杂。电力现货价格与单位或有合同价格之间的差异激励发电厂谎报其状况并以分销商的费用赚取利润。为防止误报，经销商可以对工厂进行检查，如果发现误报，将处以罚款。我们发现，在某些情况下，某种类型的误报可以使工厂和经销商都受益，因为它充当了双方之间的风险分配机制。我们证明，这种风险分配机制相当于使用状态相关选项并禁止误报。
This paper analyzes a unit-contingent power purchase agreement between an electricity distributor and a power plant. Under such a contract the distributor pays the plant a fixed price if the plant is operational and nothing if plant outage occurs. Pricing a unit-contingent contract is complicated by the fact that the plant's true status is its private information. The difference between the electricity spot price and the unit-contingent contract price provides an incentive for the plant to misreport its status and earn profit at the distributor's expense. To prevent misreporting, the distributor may inspect the plant and levy penalties if misreporting is discovered. We find that some type of misreporting under certain circumstances can benefit both the plant and the distributor, because it serves as a risk-allocation mechanism between the two parties. We show that such a risk-allocation mechanism is equivalent to using state-contingent options and prohibiting misreporting.