Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information
Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2011.09.003
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发表时间：
2012-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yina Li;Xuejun Xu;Xiande Zhao;J. Yeung;Fei Ye
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yina Li;Xuejun Xu;Xiande Zhao;J. Yeung;Fei Ye
研究了提前期可控的由供应商和买家组成的分散式供应链中的协调决策问题。分析了两种供应链库存模型。在第一个模型中，我们假设供应商拥有关于买方成本结构的完整信息。通过同时考虑供应商和买方的个体理性，设计了一种边际支付协调机制，以实现供应链的帕累托优势。在第二个模型中，我们考虑了买方拥有私人成本信息的情况。通过委托代理模型设计协调机制，促使买方报告其真实的成本结构。并编制了求解程序，得到了这两个模型的最优解。算例结果表明，在一定程度上缩短提前期可以降低库存成本，针对对称和非对称信息情况设计的协调机制是有效的。
This paper considers coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a vendor and a buyer with controllable lead time. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. In the first model we assume the vendor has complete information about the buyer’s cost structure. By taking both the vendor and the buyer’s individual rationalities into consideration, a side payment coordination mechanism is designed to realize supply chain Pareto dominance. In the second model we consider a setting where the buyer possesses private cost information. We design the coordination mechanism by using principal–agent model to induce the buyer to report his true cost structure. The solution procedures are also developed to get the optimal solutions of these two models. The results of numerical examples show that shortening lead time to certain extent can reduce inventory cost and the coordination mechanisms designed for both symmetric and asymmetric information situations are effective.