Does the Safety Net for Banks Cause Moral Hazard or Prevent Excessive Risk Taking? Evidence from Japan in the 1990s

Does the Safety Net for Banks Cause Moral Hazard or Prevent Excessive Risk Taking? Evidence from Japan in the 1990s
复制标题

银行安全网是否会导致道德风险或防止过度冒险?

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
--
期刊:
The Review of Financial Studies (submitted to journal, Feb. 2006)(発表予定)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
TRAN Hanh Bich
TRAN Hanh Bich
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Cruz;A.M.;Steinberg;L.J.;TRAN Hanh Bich

文献摘要

相似文献