Smart Subsidies for Conservation

Smart Subsidies for Conservation
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DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01203.x
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发表时间:
2008-01-01
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Shogren, Jason F.
Shogren, Jason F.
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Parkhurst, Gregory M.;Shogren, Jason F.

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保护人口稠密地区受威胁的生物多样性热点需要建立景观规模的连续保护区和走廊,以支持可行的物种种群和生态过程(例如,Cincotta、Wisnewski 和 Engelman 2000;Margules 和 Pressey 2000)。然而,如果没有私人土地所有者的自愿合作,建立连续的保护区是不可能完成的。如果经济损失得到补偿,他们的合作可能性就更大,例如美国保护储备计划(Innes、Polasky 和 ​​Tschirhart 1998;Farraro 和 Kiss 2002)。我们探索如何利用明智的补贴来自愿创建连续的栖息地。当相邻土地所有者收回与其他保护地块(包括自己的和邻居)相邻的土地时,明智的补贴会支付额外的集聚红利,从而在相邻土地所有者之间产生了显着的网络外部性(Parkhurst等人,2002年;Parkhurst和Shogren,2007年;Warziniack、Shogren和Parkhurst,2007年;Drechsler等人,2007年)。
Protecting threatened biodiversity hotspots in densely populated areas requires the creation of landscape-scale contiguous reserves and corridors to support viable species populations and ecological processes (eg, Cincotta, Wisnewski, and Engelman 2000; Margules and Pressey 2000). Creating contiguous protected areas cannot be accomplished, however, without the voluntary cooperation of private landholders. Their cooperation is more likely if they are compensated for financial losses, eg, US Conservation Reserve Program (Innes, Polasky, and Tschirhart 1998; Farraro and Kiss 2002). We explore how a smart subsidy can be used to create contiguous habitat voluntarily. The smart subsidy creates an explicit network externality between neighboring landowners by paying an additional agglomeration bonus when they retire land adjacent to other conserved parcels, both their own and their neighbors (Parkhurst et al. 2002; Parkhurst and Shogren 2007; Warziniack, Shogren, and Parkhurst 2007; Drechsler et al. 2007).