On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences
On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences
复制标题
动态偏好顺序匹配中随机串行独裁的可操作性
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744
复制
发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Cohen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hadi Hosseini;K. Larson;R. Cohen
We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.