Revenue‐Sharing Contracts under Demand Uncertainty in Shopping Center
Revenue‐Sharing Contracts under Demand Uncertainty in Shopping Center
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DOI：
10.1111/1540-6229.12263
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发表时间：
2018-10
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
A. Monden;Katsuyoshi Takashima;Yusuke Zennyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Monden;Katsuyoshi Takashima;Yusuke Zennyo
本文研究了具有两部分关税结构的购物中心租赁合同：收取固定租金加上一定比例的销售额。我们考虑一个博弈论模型，其中购物中心开发商为两种类型的零售商提供不同的合同：大型和小型。零售商面临需求的不确定性。我们显示开发商为大型零售商提供了较低的百分比费用。或者，它为大型零售商提供更高的固定费用，除非小型零售商面临很大程度上不确定的需求。开发商的预期利润随着需求的不确定性而增加，这表明开发商应该聚集几乎同质的零售商。
This article investigates shopping center rent contracts that have a two‐part tariff structure: charging a fixed rent plus a percentage of sales. We consider a game‐theoretic model, wherein a shopping center developer offers different contracts for two types of retailers: large and small. The retailers face demand uncertainties. We show the developer offers a lower percentage fee for the large retailer. Alternatively, it offers a higher fixed fee for the large retailer, unless the small retailer faces largely uncertain demand. The developer's expected profit increases with the demand uncertainty, which would suggest the developer should assemble nearly homogeneous retailers.