The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies
The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies
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议会民主国家的政府议程
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lanny W. Martin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lanny W. Martin
立法对联合政府来说是一个挑战，因为它本质上要求政策目标不同的政党进行合作和妥协。内阁政府的管辖权制度使问题更加严重，因为它为各政党提供了破坏联合政府讨价还价的手段，以追求自己的政策利益。在这篇文章中，我探讨是否安排，允许合作伙伴警察彼此诱导妥协的最重要的决定之一，由政府的组织的政策议程。在对来自四个欧洲民主国家的800多项政府法案的时间和政策内容的原始数据进行分析时，我发现联合政府在很大程度上追求一个“平衡”的议程。涉及对联盟所有伙伴更有吸引力的问题的政策倡议可能会在议程上得到优先考虑，而涉及相对没有吸引力的问题的政策倡议可能会被推迟。
Lawmaking is a challenge for coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent policy goals. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government exacerbates the problem by providing parties the means to undermine the coalition bargain in the pursuit of their own policy interests. In this article, I explore whether arrangements that allow partners to police one another induce compromise on one of the most important decisions taken by a government—the organization of the policy agenda. In an analysis of original data on the timing and policy content of over 800 government bills from four European democracies, I show that coalition governments pursue a largely “accommodative” agenda. Policy initiatives dealing with issues that are more attractive to all partners in the coalition are likely to be given priority on the agenda, while those dealing with relatively unattractive issues are likely to be postponed.