Platforms Exclude But Do Not Segregate
Platforms Exclude But Do Not Segregate
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平台排除但不隔离
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2337052
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andre Veiga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andre Veiga
像电信网络这样的平台将参与分成组，组的质量由组的组成决定。垄断者可能会通过提供几个相互排斥的不同质量和价格的群体来进行价格歧视，但这种行为在平台行业中似乎并不存在。原因在于，在正的网络外部性下，福利和利润最大化的群体结构都涉及单个群体，后者具有更高的价格。
Platforms like telecommunication networks sell participation into groups, with group quality being determined by group composition. A monopolist may price-discriminate by offering several mutually exclusive groups of different qualities and prices, but such behavior seems absent from platform industries. The reason is that, under positive network externalities, both the welfare and profit maximizing group structures involve a single group, the latter having a higher price.