Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms

Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms
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电话公司私有化中的垄断权

DOI:
10.1007/s11127-007-9185-6
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
B. Viani
B. Viani
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
B. Viani

文献摘要

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摘要 分析了74个国家的公用事业私有化销售数据,以调查为什么政府授予垄断权,以及垄断如何影响政府从这些销售中获得的收入。财政紧张的政府更有可能授予垄断权。利益集团和机构很重要。征税的商业用户的重要性增加降低了政府授予垄断权的可能性,而补贴住宅用户重要性的增加则产生了相反的效果。持久的民主国家和以市场为导向的政府不太可能授予垄断权。垄断使政府收入增加了66%。
Abstract Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.