Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions
Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.91.5.1508
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发表时间：
2001-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Angela A. Hung;C. Plott
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Angela A. Hung;C. Plott
在随机确定的顺序中，每个代理人都被给予一个独立的私人信号，关于两个状态中的哪一个被随机抽取。在收到私人信号后，每个代理人都对国家做出了公开宣布的决定。因此，在个人决策时，每个代理人都有一个私人信号，也知道所有前面代理人的决策。实验集中在三种不同类型的组织上。(1)代理人根据他们宣布的决定是对还是错得到奖励。安德森和霍尔特（AER，1997）研究了这种“个人主义制度”。他们发现的信息级联被复制。(2)代理人根据大多数宣布的决定是正确还是错误而获得奖励。在这种“多数人统治制度”下，信息级联的情况急剧减少。(3)代理人根据他们个人宣布的决定是否与大多数人的决定相同而获得的奖励比如果他们的决定是正确的则获得的奖励更多。这一“遵守奖励制度”的动机是，在程序中，有动机提出符合他人报告的报告。观察到大量的信息级联。
In a randomly determined order, each agent was given an independent, private signal about which of two states was selected by a random draw. After receiving the private signal each agent made a publicly announced decision about the state. Thus, at the time of personal decision each agent had a private signal and also knew the decisions of all preceding agents. The experiments focused on three different types of organization. (1) Agents were rewarded according to whether their announced decision was right or wrong. This “individualistic institution" is the one studied by Anderson and Holt (AER, 1997). Their discovery of information cascades is replicated. (2) Agents were rewarded according to whether a majority of announced decisions were right or wrong. Under this “majority rule institution" the instance of information cascades is sharply reduced. (3) Agents are rewarded more according to whether their personal announced decision was the same as the majority decision than they were rewarded if their decision was correct. This "conformity rewarding institution" is motivated by proceedings in which there is incentive to produce reports that conform to the reports of others. Substantial information cascades are observed.