Putting a band-aid on a corpse: Incentives for nurses in the Indian public health care system
Putting a band-aid on a corpse: Incentives for nurses in the Indian public health care system
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DOI：
10.1162/jeea.2008.6.2-3.487
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发表时间：
2008-04-01
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Glennerster, Rachel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Banerjee, Abhijit V.;Duflo, Esther;Glennerster, Rachel
印度的公共医疗保健系统受到工作人员缺勤率高、提供者努力程度低以及倾向于私人替代品的潜在受益者使用有限的困扰。本文报告了一个地区政府和一个非政府组织进行的实验结果。该非政府组织记录了政府公共卫生设施（分中心和援助站）中的政府护士，政府采取措施惩罚最严重的违法者。最初，监测系统非常有效。这表明护士对经济激励措施反应积极。但几个月后，当地卫生管理部门似乎从内部破坏了该计划，让护士要求越来越多的“豁免日”。“该计划实施18个月后，已经完全无效。
The public Indian health care system is plagued by high staff absence, low effort by providers, and limited use by potential beneficiaries who prefer private alternatives. This artice reports the results of an experiment carried out with a district administration and a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The presence of government nurses in government public health facilities (subcenters and aid-posts) was recorded by the NGO, and the government took steps to punish the worst delinquents. Initially, the monitoring system was extremely effective. This shows that nurses are responsive to financial incentives. But after a few months, the local health administration appears to have undermined the scheme from the inside by letting the nurses claim an increasing number of "exempt days." Eighteen months after its inception, the program had become completely ineffective.