On the borders of the market: EU emissions trading, energy security, and the technopolitics of 'carbon leakage'
On the borders of the market: EU emissions trading, energy security, and the technopolitics of 'carbon leakage'
复制标题
市场边界：欧盟排放交易、能源安全和“碳泄漏”的技术政治
DOI：
10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.11.010
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Kama K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kama K
按照经济学原则组织排放交易的困难导致经济社会学家质疑政治妥协和技术条件对市场表现的重要性。本文认为，“技术政治”的社会学研究应该补充与地理的角度来看，这种市场实验是如何在更广泛的社会技术分布的做法领土化。着眼于建立一个区域集中和一体化的欧洲碳市场，它调查了2012年后电力行业交易规则中气候和能源政策之间的一个特殊妥协：能源不安全，竞争劣势和“碳泄漏”风险之间的联系。欧盟边境国家对碳定价的抵制使“碳泄漏”被重新定义为将发电转移到非市场供应商的威胁，这加强了以国家为中心的碳密集型生产战略。这一案例证明了技术政治的三个基本空间困境，有助于市场化的地理研究。首先，市场的领土前提加剧了分配排放配额的政治，使新自由主义形式的气候变化治理与国家主权主张发生冲突。第二，计算碳交换的技术方面不能与市场区域的其他跨界流通模式，如输电网络分开。第三，碳市场化的实验可以产生空间差异化的影响，挑战市场领土的封闭，并在市场边界上创造一个有争议的“前沿地区”，有不同的交易规则。
The difficulties of organizing emissions trading in line with the principles of economics have led economic sociologists to interrogate the significance of political compromises and technical conditions to the performance of markets. This article argues that sociological studies of ‘techno-politics’ should be complemented with a geographical perspective concerned with how such market experiments are territorialized in relation to wider socio-technically distributed practices. Focusing on the setup of a regionally concentrated and integrated European market for carbon, it investigates a particular compromise made between climate and energy policies in the post-2012 trading rules for the electricity sector: a nexus created between the risks of energy insecurity, competitive disadvantage, and ‘carbon leakage’. The resistance of EU border states to carbon pricing has enabled ‘carbon leakage’ to be re-conceptualized as a threat of transferring electricity generation to non-market suppliers, which reinforces state-centred strategies of carbon-intensive production. This case evidences three fundamentally spatial predicaments of technopolitics, contributing to geographical studies of marketization. Firstly, the politics of allocating emissions allowances is exacerbated by the territorial premises of the market that bring neoliberal forms of governing climate change into conflict with state sovereignty claims. Secondly, the technical aspects of calculating carbon exchange cannot be dissociated from other transboundary modes of circulation in the market region, such as electricity transmission networks. Thirdly, experiments with carbon marketization can have spatially differentiated effects, challenging the enclosure of market territory and creating a contentious ‘frontier region’ with distinct trading rules on the borders of the market.