Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets
Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets
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自愿参与网络保险市场
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Parinaz Naghizadeh;M. Liu
网络保险既是转移剩余网络安全风险的一种方法，也是将安全投资的外部性内部化到相互依赖的系统中的一种激励机制，在文献中受到了相当大的关注。一方面，事实证明，竞争性的保险市场即使确保了用户的参与，也不能提高网络的整体安全性。另一方面，现有的文献说明了单一名单保险公司如何诱导社会最优行为(在二元决策模型下)。尽管如此，参与后一种市场被认为是强制性的。在这项工作中，我们提出了一个问题，即是否可以通过非强制性保险来激励社会最优保障投资。要做到这一点，我们不会考虑竞争市场模型，因为它是INEFfi的，而是专注于垄断的fiT中性保险公司在实施社会最优投资file的过程中扮演的监管者的角色。fi首先提出了一种允许连续决策模型的保险设计机制，然后研究了用户的参与激励。我们发现，由于安全性的非排他性，可能存在不可能保证用户自愿购买保险的场景。我们讨论了这种不可能性的含义和可能的规避方法。
The study of cyber-insurance, both as a method for transferring residual cyber-security risks, and as an incentive mechanism for internalizing the externalities of security investments in interdependent systems, has received considerable attention in the literature. On one hand, it has been shown that competitive insurance markets, even though ensuring user participation, fail to improve the overall network security. On the other hand, existing literature illustrates how a monopo-list insurer can induce socially optimal behavior (under a binary decision model). Nevertheless, participation in the latter market is assumed to be mandatory. In this work, we ask the question of whether socially optimal security investments can be incentivized through non-compulsory insurance. To do so, we will not consider the competitive market model due to its inefficiencies, and focus instead on the role of a monopolist profit-neutral insurer acting as a regulator in implementing the socially optimal investment profile. We first propose an insurance design mechanism that allows a continuous decision model, and then study users’ participation incentives. We show that due to the non-excludable nature of security, there may exist scenarios in which it is impossible to guarantee that users voluntarily purchase insurance. We discuss the implication of this impossibility and possible ways to circumvent it.