OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE CONTEMPORARY CORPORATION: A GENERAL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE CONTEMPORARY CORPORATION: A GENERAL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
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所有权、控制权和当代公司：一般行为分析
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-6435.1976.tb01974.x
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发表时间：
1976
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
J. McKean
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Kania;J. McKean
简单的新古典企业理论是否无法预测现代公司企业的行为？其他研究也对利润表现进行了研究，但结果相互矛盾。结合最近数据的研究发现，所有者和管理者控制的公司在盈利能力方面几乎没有区别。公司的其他理论表明，其他绩效指标，如稳定性和增长可能会有所不同，所有者和管理者控制类型。从蒙森、唐斯、鲍莫尔、伯利、李本斯坦、帕尔默等人的相关理论中所包含的思想中，描绘出六个一般的行为变量。这些变量进行了分析与协方差分析模型应用于178个美国公司的样本。一半的样本是所有者控制的公司，而其余的是管理者控制的公司。每个行业均单独分析，以减少因会计惯例或行业业务状况而产生的抽样差异。样本基础是美国前1,800家公司。对于所研究的七个变量中的任何一个，都没有发现由于控制类型而导致的公司绩效的普遍一致差异。进一步的测试进行，看看是否（1）公司经营集中的市场或（2）公司是占主导地位的行业，有一个更大的趋势，所有者-经理人的差异，在公司业绩。这两个测试都是负面的，表明竞争力并不是限制所有者和管理者控制的公司之间的业绩差异的因素。
Does the simple neoclassical theory of the firm fail to predict the behavior of the modern corporate firm? Other studies have examined profit performance with conflicting results. Studies incorporating more recent data find little difference between owner and manager-controlled firms with respect to profitability. Alternative theories of the firms suggest that other performance measures such as stability and growth may differ between owner and manager-control type. Six general behavioral variables are delineated from ideas contained in the related theories of MONSEN, DOWNS, BAUMOL, BERLE, LIEBENSTEIN, PALMER, and others. These variables are analyzed with an analysis of covariance model applied to a sample of 178 American corporations. Half of the sample is owner-controlled corporations while the remainder is manager-controlled. Each industry is analyzed separately to reduce sampling variation due to accounting convention or industry business conditions. The sample base is the top 1,800 firms in the US No general consistent differences in firm performance due to type of control are found for any of the seven variables investigated. A further test was conducted to see if either (1) firms operating in concentrated markets or (2) firms which are dominant in their industry, have a greater tendency for owner-manager differences in firm performance. Both tests were negative indicating that competitive forces were not the element restricting the latitude for performance differences between owner and manager-controlled firms.